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ARTICLES

THE THIRD HOUSE OF CONGRESS
VERSUS THE FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT: THE IMPACT OF
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF ON
AGENCY REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING*
JAMES

P. HILL**

This article presents a simple yet unsettling proposition: regulatory decision-making, among the most intrusive and pervasive aspects of federal activity, is largely the product of two politically unaccountable bureaucracies. Unelected congressional committee staffs
and unelected regulatory agency officials comprise these two politically unaccountable bureaucracies. Both of these bureaucracies have
developed outside the constitutional framework. Modern regulatory
decision-making, therefore, is not the result of formal directives or
interactions between the regulators and their constitutionally
elected masters. Instead, modern regulatory decisions-making is the
result of only informal negotiations between the unelected congressional committee staff members and the unelected regulatory agency
officials.
By largely ignoring the significant role that congressional committee staff members play in influencing the process and product of
regulatory decision-making, reformers proposing formal changes in
the rulemaking process risk overlooking the need for simultaneous
exploration of informal reforms.' This article explores the growth
and development of the informal committee staff bureaucracy and
* This article is the product of research funded by the Dirksen Congressional
Research Foundation and Central Michigan University.
** Associate Professor, Central Michigan University. B.A. Michigan State Uni-

versity; M.P.A. Harvard University; J.D. University of Michigan, 1975.
1. The most common formal proposals advocated in recent years include the
legislative veto, increased court review of rulemaking, sunset legislation, a regulatory
budget, cost-benefit analysis requirements, regulatory negotiation commissions, and
increased Presidential control over rulemaking.
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its impact on regulatory decision-making in the 1970's.
INTRODUCTION

Federal administrative agencies are sometimes referred to as
the fourth branch of government. In the 1970's this country saw a
dramatic expansion of this so-called fourth branch of government
with a concommitant rise in federal regulatory activity.' As a result,
legal scholars and political scientists alike were confronted by the
troubling question: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (Who will regulate the regulators?) The common initial approach in responding to
this question is to address it only in formal constitutional terms. Recently the United States Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,s invoked formal constitutional requirements in answering such a question. In Chadha, the Court
invoked the constitutional requirements of the bicameral clause"
and the presentment clause5 to delineate the relationship between
Congress and its administrative agencies.
Reliance on a formalistic constitutional approach in order to
unravel the issue of regulatory control, however, ignores the reality
of our modern regulatory system. It ignores the informal delegation
of oversight authority granted by Congress to a bureaucratic subsystem that developed outside the constitutional framework. Specifically, it ignores the informal delegation of authority to the congressional committee staff.
This article focuses on the critical, but overlooked, informal
oversight role Congress delegates to its committee staff. The dramatic growth in regulatory activity and in the size of the adminis2. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
"They [administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a
fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking." Id.
3. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
6. One indicator of increased regulatory activity was the growth in the number
of pages in the Federal Register.
1973 - 35,586
1974 - 45,422
1975 - 60,221
1976

-

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 -

57,072
63,629
61,261
77,497
87,012
63,554

(Reagan Presidency)

N. ORNSTEIN, T. MANN, M. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1982, 139 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as VITAL STATISTICS].
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trative branch 7 during the mid-1970's compelled Congress to delegate this oversight role. Congressional approval of an enlarged
committee staff bureaucracy was a key factor in enabling members
to perform this oversight role. In fact, committee staff sizes increased by 56 percent in the mid-70's. A noticeable decline in this
enlarged staff membership did not occur until 1981.
United States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued that
the congressional response of increasing staff levels was predictable.
The purpose was to meet the challenge of a growing executive bureaucracy under what he termed was the "Iron Law of Emulation."
As Moynihan theorized:
If a large (and unsupported) forecast may be permitted, it is that the
long-run effect of competitive emulation will be to create government
by submerged, horizontal bureaucracies that link the three branches
of government. They will speak their own language and stay in place
while their constitutional masters come and go.'
With regard to the importance of one of these submerged bureaucracies, 1 namely the congressional committee staffs, Moynihan
observed:
They [the regulations] are probably comprehensible to the committee
staff of the Congress, who draft the legislation which the regulations
typically carry out. But I know it to be true-in my case, and I cannot
suppose I am alone-that most legislative language is incomprehensibleto me. I depend utterly on translations. 2
7. Created during this period were the Environmental Protection Agency
(1970), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1970), and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (1973).
8. Staff size of House and Senate Standing Committees:
Year
House
Senate
1973
878
873
1974
1,107
948
1975
1,433
1,277
1976
1,680
1,201
1977
1,776
1,028*
1978

1,844

1,151

1979
1,909
1,269
1980
1,917
1,191
1981 (Reagan Presidency)
1,843
1,022
* Decline caused by committee reorganization that went into effect in 1977 which
shifted S. Res. 60 Senate staff committee to personal staff payrolls. VITAL STATISTICS,
supra note 6, at 113.
9. D.P. MOYNIHAN, IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT 65 (1978). The Iron Law of Emulation

provides that whenever any branch of the government acquires a new technique
which enhances its power in relation to the other branches, that technique will soon
be adopted by those other branches as well. Id.
10. Id. at 31.
11. Other submerged staff bureaucracies include congressional personal staffs,
support agency staffs such as the General Accounting Office and the congressional
Research Service, and formal and informal caucus and coalition staffs.
12. D.P. MOYNIHAN, supra note 9, at 31.
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Have congressional committee staff members, Senator Moynihan's translators, significantly influenced regulatory decision-making? Did this influence occur during the regulatory explosion of the
1970's? Samuel Patterson delineated the importance of congressional committee staffs in executive-legislative branch relations:
In a sense, the committee staff is at the center of a policy subsystem,
linking House and Senate committees with the executive departments
concerned with the substantive policy area of the committee. Accordingly, committee staffs have a substantive innovative capability, and
potentially a very wide influence over public policy originating in committees and subcommittees.'"
Curiously, however, the few studies which address the phenomenal
growth of the congressional staff in the mid-1970's do not explore
the informal power that committee staff members exercise in the
regulatory arena. Instead, they focus on the legislative, rather than
the regulatory consequences, of staff growth."' At best, congressional
staff studies have made only passing reference to the impact of staff
on regulatory activity.' 5 Yet a review of legal literature, political science literature, court decisions, congressional legislation, committee
reports, committee surveys, newspaper accounts, and a recent university survey' 6 indicate that during the mid-1970's congressional
committee staff may have played a more significant role in the development and implementation of the regulatory schemes than generally realized.
To assess the regulatory significance of heightened committee
staff involvement requires examination of the legal and political
consequences of delegating to congressional committee staffs the
task of overseeing the so-called fourth branch of government. The
period chosen for exploring staff significance is the regulatory boom
era of the 1970's. This period is significant because it set the stage
for emergence of a large and powerful committee staff bureaucracy.
An examination of the formal and informal powers available to the
staff to affect regulatory decision-making during this period will be
assessed. Finally, the impact of this committee staff bureaucracy on
the formal congressional oversight process and on the development
and implementation of regulatory schemes devised by agency bureaucracies will be explored. Through this process, the significance
13. Patterson, The ProfessionalStaffs of CongressionalCommittees, 15 AD. Sci.

Q.22, 35 (1970).
14.

See M.

MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES:

CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND

THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN
LAWMAKING (1980); H.W. Fox AND S.W. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS (1977).

15. For an excellent survey of the roles legislative staffs play in the legislative
process, see Hammond, Legislative Staffs, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 271 (1984).
16. Unpublished Central Michigan University 1984 Survey conducted through

grants from the Dirksen Congressional Foundation and the Central Michigan University Research Professor Program.
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of a largely unexplored staff subsystem process which developed
outside the constitutional framework will be demonstrated. Specific
emphasis will be placed on the impact of congressional committee
staffs on the agency regulatory decision-making process of the
1970's.
THE REGULATORY EXPLOSION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE

1970's
While committee staffs have historically played some role in
regulatory oversight, the dramatic growth in regulatory activity,
along with major institutional changes in the executive and legislative branches during the 1970's, created a unique opportunity for
more extensive staff involvement in the oversight of regulatory agencies. The Council of Economic Advisers remarked that in the 1970's
the growth in the number and size of regulatory agencies was greater
than that which took place during the New Deal period. 7 At the
same time that regulatory activity began to increase, 8 executive
control over these agencies steadily declined. By 1974 President
Nixon had resigned. President Nixon's resignation, and the Watergate scandal that precipitated it, both contributed to a decline in
the steady progression of executive reports calling for measures to
strengthen management control over federal agencies."0 Indeed,
Watergate created a vacuum in executive branch control over federal agency activity. 0 Donald Santarelli, then director of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, boldly conjectured that
there was in fact a total absence of White House control in 1974.21
The year 1974 was also a pivotal year for Congress. In 1974
Congress underwent a dramatic change in both composition and
power brokerage. The 1974 election brought to Congress the largest
class of new Democrats (75) since 1948.2 This surge of new Democrats changed both the factional composition and issue orientation
of the House of Representatives.23 This dramatic change in House
composition provided enough votes for the House to implement reforms which led to both the ousting of three committee chairmen
and the dispersal of the centralized power of committee chairmen to
17.
18.

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 134 (1982).

See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., 21ST
SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 116 (Comm. Print 1977). (In 1974, 67 federal
agencies adopted 7,596 new or amended regulations).
19.

R. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 5 (1983).

20. Id. at 55. "White House control over the domestic agencies in the final days
of the Nixon presidency was all but nonexistent." Id.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Whatever Happened to the Watergate Babies, 42 CONG. Q. 498 (1984).
23. K. KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS xvi (1977).
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the subcommittee level."' As a result, wrote a former congressional
aide, "many subcommittees gained increased importance and subcommittee chairmanships were parcelled out among junior members. '2 5 This dispersal of committee power also resulted in increasing the influence of many subcommittee staff members who
previously were relegated to positions of secondary importance visa-vis a full committee staff.
Watergate and the decline of executive authority over a largely
autonomous regulatory structure provided the impetus for Congress
to increase its oversight and involvement in federal agency activity.2
congressional concern was especially focused on new health and
safety regulations which were then being promulgated by the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), Occupation Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).27 These new health

and safety regulations were described by former EPA Administrator
Douglas Costle as, "[tihe new forms of regulation that rapidly developed in the
1970's. . .that we have only begun to learn how to
28
measure."
One indication of the increase in congressional oversight and involvement in federal agency activity was the dramatic jump in the
number of House committee and subcommittee meetings held immediately after the Watergate scandal. 29 A second indication was
the fact that more than half of all the important legislative vetoes
occurring between 1970 and 1975 were passed in only one year,
namely 1975.80 With regard to legislative vetoes, Robert Dixon

wrote: "This development represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from vigorous oversight of the executive, through
hearings, reports, and revision of statutes, to shared administration
under existing statutory delegations."'" Still another indication was
the explosive growth of congressional ad hoc groups formed to lobby
for administrative favors during this period. 2
24.

Hopkins, The Ninety-Fourth: A Congress in Transition,62 AM. B. J. 65, 66

(1976).
25. Id. at 66.
26. J. ABERBACH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: CONCEPTS AND ANALYSIS (Sept. 1977). (The University of Michigan Institute of
Public Policies Discussion Paper No. 100).
27. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L.
REv. 409, 413 (1982).

28. Id.
29. VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 131. House committee and subcommittee
meetings increased from 5,888 in 1973-74 to 6,975 in 1975-76. Id.
30. Comment, Congressional Oversight of Administrative Discretion:Defining
the Proper Role of the Legislative Veto, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1018, 1023 (1977).
31. Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive
on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423, 427-28 (1978).
32. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, The Informal Caucus
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Whatever the reason for the earlier broad delegations of legislative authority granted to regulatory agencies, after 1974 Congress
became more involved in the details of agency regulatory activities
through a revitalization of subcommittee oversight activity. This
more active congressional involvement did not, however, occur as a
personal undertaking by members of Congress. Rather it was undertaken by a growing number of unelected committee staff. The committee staffs emergence as overseer of the regulatory establishment
is the avenue that this paper will next explore.
THE EMERGENCE OF A STAFF BUREAUCRACY

The institutional ferment of the 1970's, together with a significantly enlarged committee staff, created a favorable environment for
the emergence of a potent committee staff bureaucracy to oversee
the regulatory arena."3 As committee staff members increased, so too
did the opportunities to expand their involvement in regulatory
oversight. Thus, Eric Redman's observations about the importance
of staff in the legislative process are equally applicable to their significant role in helping Congress vie with the President for control
of the regulatory process. Mr. Redman stated:
[Ainyone who knew the Senate would know that to ignore the role of
staff is to ignore not only Senate reality but the key reason why the
Senate is still capable of vying with the President for legislative leadership (The same
could be said, of course, for the House of
34
Representatives).

Recent literature, however, has focused only upon the
congressional staff's impact on the complexity of recent
sional legislative activity.35 Accordingly, whatever the
given for the rapid expansion of congressional staff,"6 it has

enlarged
congresrationale
been the

(July 14, 1982) (audio brief). Forty of the 70 modern informal congressional caucuses
were formed between 1974-1980.
33. R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN INCOMMITTEES 82 (1973) Fenno distinguished committee staffs from personal staff, characterizing the latter as larger and exhibiting
more of the characteristics associated with complex, specialized bureaucracies.
34. E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 17 (1973).
35. H.W. Fox AND S.W. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS (1977).
36. See J. WEATHERFORD, TRIBES ON THE HILLS 217 (1981).
Staff growth in the 1970's received an extra push from the rather unlikely
source of President Richard Nixon. The Democratic Congress initially increased staff as a way to fight the Republican White House more effectively,
but a significant boost to congressional staff came from the Watergate tapes. A

conversation between John Dean and President Nixon on February 23, 1973,
particularly piqued congressional self-importance:
D: I spent some years on the Hill myself and one of the things I always noticed
was the inability of the Congress to deal effectively with the Executive Branch
because they never provide themselves with adequate staffs, had adequate information availableP: Well, they have huge staffs compared to what we had.

(Vol. 19:247
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legislative rather than the regulatory impact that has received scholarly attention. 7 The Supreme Court's acceptance of congressional

staff members as the "alter ego" of the Congressmen in the legislative process" only reinforced the notion that their primary significance was legislative in nature.
The large congressional committee staff bureaucracy that developed in the mid-1970's not only increased congressional legislative
activity but also increased the indirect ability of Congress to oversee
the activities of federal agencies. In the wake of adverse public reaction to the explosion of regulatory activity in the 1970's, political
necessity caused an increasingly overextended Congress to increase

its reliance on committee staffs to control the regulators.8 9 It was no
coincidence that four of the five major legislative measures involving
the hiring of an increased number of committee staff members were
passed in the midst of the 1970's regulatory boom.40 Nor should it
come as any surprise that committee staff increases since 1970 were

particularly significant in committees who had oversight responsibilities over controversial new or emerging social regulatory agencies

such as the EPA, the OSHA, the CPSC, and the FTC.' 1 Finally, it is
D: Well, they have huge staffs, true, as compared to what they had years ago.
But they are still inadequate to deal effectivelyP: . . .Don't try to help them out.
(Congress of course, assumed the Nixon White House knew something about
organization, which they didn't, and interpreting Dean's comment about "adequate staff" to mean more staff, immediately increased the payroll.)
37. For an interesting perspective of congressional staffers in the 1950-60 era
see

CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN

(1963).

38. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
39. VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 97. The average Senator in 1975-76 had
17.6 committee and subcommittee assignments. In 1980-81, the average Senator had
dropped to 10.7 assignments. United States Senator James Pearson complained: "The
larger the staff you accumulate, the wider the range of work there is, and the subject
gets away from you." U.S. News & World Rep., May 15, 1978, at 22.
40. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812
(a permanent complement of Committee staff-4 professional and 6 clerical); The
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (increase to
six professional aides and minority hiring); The House Reform Amendments of 1974
(H. Res. 988) tripled the staffs of most standing committees; S. Res. 60 provided
three associate committee assistants for each Senator; and the Senate Committee
System Reorganization Amendments of 1977 dealt with proportionate staffs and minority staff funding.
41. VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 6.
(H)
(H)
(H)
(H)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

Committee:
Energy & Interstate Commerce
Appropriations
Education & Labor
Government Operations
Government Affairs
Labor & Human Resources
Appropriations
Commerce

(S) Environment & Public Works
* Reagan Presidency

'70
42
71
77
60
55
69
42
53

'75
112
98
114
68
144
150
72
111

'79
150
129
121
85
179
155
80
96

'81"
151
127
121
84
153**
119**
79**
78**

34

70

74

56**

** Republican control of the Senate
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significant that most of the committee staff increases, at least in the
House, occurred at the subcommittee level, the source of most con4
gressional oversight activity. '
Even though the number of committee staffers dramatically increased after 1973, a 1977 congressional study of federal regulation
noted that most oversight remained ad hoc in nature and was stimulated more by news articles, by complaints from constituents, by
special interest groups, or by information from disgruntled agency
employees, rather than by a coordinated staff oversight process.'8
Aberbach's 1977 study of the quality of oversight indicates, in fact,
that increased numbers of committee staff only confused an already
uncoordinated oversight process:
However, when authority over staff is dispersed, increases in the number of staff people are more likely to lead to increases in the level of
oversight activity than to increases in systematic oversight. The
problems of lack of coordination and lack of an orderly, methodical
approach to oversight are, in fact, probably exacerbated by mere increases in the number of staff aids."
Even if increased numbers of congressional committee staff have not
improved regulatory oversight quality or coordination, they have significantly transformed the committee staff subsystem.
Several of the more important changes in the enlarged committee staff should be noted. For example, by 1975 the so-called temporary investigative committee staff personnel had become well-entrenched members of the statutory committee staff bureaucracy."5
Many of these new committee staff members could be classified as
social activists" in contrast to the conservative staff members described by Clapp in the early 1960's. 47 This reflected the changing
philosophical composition of the permanent committee staff
bureaucracy.
Studies indicating a high turnover of staff during the 1970's 4 8
42. See M. MALRIN, supra note 14, at 17; see also KOFMEHL, supra note 23, at
xxvi-xxvii. The author points out that as a result of the House Committee Reform
Amendments of 1974, House committees hired an additional 218 regular staff members in 1975 and 191 more specially authorized personnel than in 1974. Also, only
nine months after passage of Senate Resolution 60, the Senate hired 291 additional
staff, and during the rest of 1975 Senate committees hired 411 more employees.
43. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 18, at 121.
44. ARERBACH, supra note 26, at 7. See also CMU Survey, supra note 16. In the
CMU Survey one regulator noted: "Increased staff impedes rather than facilitates the
process-too many cooks-the more people the agencies have pulling on them, the
freer they are to do what they please." Id.
45. H. MANSFIELD, CONGRESS AGAINST THE PRESIDENCY 114 (1975).
46. Why Congress Delegated Power, Wall St. J., July 8, 1983, at 12, col. 1.
47. See C. CLAPP, supra note 36.
48. Salisbury & Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties That
Bind, 75 AM. POL. Sod. REV. 381, 386 (1981).
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also meant many committee staff members now lacked the institutional memory characteristic of the professional committee staff experts.4 9 This data further highlighted the growing divergence in
goals between the traditional professional committee staffer and the
emerging policy entrepreneur." Even the political environment in
which the committee staffs toiled changed during the mid-1970's. As
Michael Pertschuk, a former key committee staff member and regulator noted, President Carter's appointment of social activitists to
federal regulatory agencies limited new legislative opportunities for
committee staff members.51 Instead, the staff was forced to focus
upon negative oversight of the new regulators' initiatives as a substitute for legislative activity in order to justify their presence.
The simultaneous formal institutional changes in the congressional committee system previously mentioned, coupled with the significant transformation of the committee staff subsystem did, however, provide a unique opportunity for an enlarged committee staff
to exercise the latent yet considerable powers delegated to it by
Congress in the regulatory arena. It is to an examination of the staff
regulatory oversight power that this article now turns. This line of
inquiry is pursued in order to explore the nature and extent of informal committee staff influence over regulatory development. The
amount of informal committee staff influence over regulatory development is important because the degree to which this de facto authority to oversee and influence regulatory development resides, and
is exercised at the staff level, presents a new twist to the issue of
formal congressional control over federal regulators. The issue next
confronted is specifically: what are the legal implications, the political implications, and the regulatory consequences of Congress informally delegating its authority to oversee an unelected regulatory bureaucracy to an unelected committee staff bureaucracy?
THE INFORMAL POWERS OF COMMITTEE STAFF

The informal oversight power delegated to the committee staffs
is considerable. This delegation is particularly significant in the regulatory arena because Congress almost totally depends on its committee staff to perform regulatory oversight. This means that much
of the committee staff interaction with regulatory agencies is not
subject to congressional supervision. 2
The corresponding growth of committee staff and proliferation
49. R. JONES & D.P.

WOLL, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF CONGRESS 161 (1979).
50. Price, Professionaland Entrepreneurs:Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. OF POL. 316, 335 (1971).
51. M. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 67 (1982).
52. B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 126-27 (1983).
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of subcommittees only served to enhance the opportunity for staffers to expand their influence.53 With the increase in congressional
committee responsibilities and the corresponding decrease in staff
supervision, committee staff members were better able to pursue
their own initiatives, particularly in the regulatory arena. Furthermore, although staff members often publicly disclaimed their own
importance,55 the availability of these powers to a growing,
unelected staff bureaucracy raised a number of important questions
related both to the issue of delegation of legislative authority and to
the issue of political accountability.
Staff powers in the modern regulatory oversight arena have
been enhanced because they have been exercised in conjunction with
formal congressional oversight techniques; thus, legitimizing committee staff members informal interaction and negotiation with the
regulators. Formal congressional oversight techniques such as oversight hearings, congressional investigations, statutorily-mandated
agency reporting requirements, statutory amendments to agency enabling acts, legislative veto provisions, congressional casework inquiries, and agency confirmation hearings have also provided committee staff members with numerous opportunities to influence
regulatory decision-making. To appreciate the ability and extent to
which staff members can influence regulatory behavior without seeking congressional approval, an elaboration of the significance of the
committee staffs informal oversight power is provided.
A.

Oversight hearings

In many respects oversight hearings, held to review agency activities, are initiated, structured, and directed by the committee
staff rather than by the committee members. Subcommittee staff,
according to one survey, were the most frequent initiators of subcommittee hearings." This gives the staff the power to threaten that
a hearing will be held where an agency is unresponsive to staff
probes. The threat of a hearing carries a heavy price tag in terms of
research and preparation time. This causes a reduction in agency
resources for some projects as well as a redirection of agency attention.5 7 As United States Representative Fernand J. St. Germain
53. G. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 26 (1979).
54. See With Shorter Stays For Legislators, Bigger Staffs, Who'll Run Congress, 203 Sc. 245, 247 (1979).

55. Jones & Woll, The Tail and The Dog: How the Staff Wags Congress, 11
WASH. MONTHLY

30, 37 (1979).

56. Stenger, Congressional Committee Staff Members: Advocates or Process
Administrators? (April 1978) (unpublished thesis in Southern Ill. Univ. Library).
57. See, 1976 Bicentennial Institute, 28 AD. L. REV. 569, 734 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Bicentennial Institute]; see also STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note
18, at 80 (involving the increase in oversight hearings for regulatory agencies).
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complained:
You have situations where the staff sets in motion the machinery for
reports, inquiries, research, and, lo and behold, you've got a hearing
underway. This is costly in money and manpower, not just for Congress but for business and other private groups that spend enormous
sums getting ready for the hearings. 8
Once the hearing is approved by the committee the staff is responsible for organizing it, selecting witnesses, and briefing committee members. This is all in addition to drafting questions for the
staff to pose to the witnesses.59 One survey indicates that it is common for staff, not only to interact with prospective witnesses prior
the hearings, 60 but also to structure the appearance and topical coverage of the witnesses.61 In effect committee staff set the agenda for
the hearing process;62 they control the flow and presentation of information. Moreover, by increasing the number of hearings, committee staff can provide themselves with more autonomy to oversee an
agency's activity because Congressmen are often unable or unwilling
to focus upon the more mundane regulatory hearings.
B.

Authorization and appropriationhearings

These hearings are the financial lifeblood of an agency, and the
agency's financial operation is dependent upon favorable committee
action. While the importance of formal authorization and appropriation hearings cannot be ignored, what is more significant is that
much of the negotiation over the content of the all-important final
conference committee bill is handled informally at the committee
staff level.63 Indeed, because of committee staff access to the committee and subcommittee chairmen and because of increasing committee dependence on staff, what Patterson wrote in 1970 is even
more appropriate today: "The success of the agency in congressional
hearings depends upon effective anticipation of the interests and
concerns of the committee staff, since these interests tend to be, or
Oversight hearings for Regulatory Agencies

Congress
House
Senate
91st
4
3
92nd
4
1
93rd
7
5
94th
14
11
58. Congress Frets About Its Own Bureaucracy, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1978, at
22.
59. Scully, Reflections of a Senate Aide, 47 PUB. INT. 41, 46 (1977).
60. Stenger, supra note 55, at 166.
61. Id. at 97.
62.

Id. at 89.

63. M.

MALBIN,

supra note 14, at 46.
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to become, the concerns of committee members." 4
Because committee staff members control both the way that information is gathered and the way that recommendations to the
committee are made,"5 earning the displeasure of the authorization
and appropriation committee staff could certainly have an adverse
affect on an agency's yearly budget. Further, committee staff members have on occasion been known to take formal actions, although
contrary at times to the committee's wishes, when it suited them.
Clearly committee staff members do sometimes overstep their limited formal role in the oversight process."
C.

Committee investigations

Committee staff members possess the authority to probe agency
activities with or without formal committee approval. Staff powers
exercised without formal approval include: staff-initiated investigations the results of which are reported to a member to stimulate a
formal committee probe; 7 release of a staff report to Congress to
highlight an agency activity (an action which does not require a full
committee vote) ss in order to stimulate a demand from Congress for
a committee probe; or leaking the results of formal or informal committee investigations to the media to stimulate public demand for
committee action."s Thus, the power of committee staff members to
informally stimulate resource-draining agency investigations and to
cause staff familiarity with agency operations make them a significant force which agencies must heed. The committee staffs views,
therefore, have an important impact on agency activities and
decisions.
D. Committee reports
Committee reports are used as one of the major sources of determining legislative intent by the courts. Committee reports have,
therefore, become an indispensable interpretive document especially
64. Patterson, supra note 13, at 25.
65. D. PRicE, THE COMMERCE COMMITTEES 329 (1975).
66. See, Wash. Post, July 17, 1983, § A, at 7, col. 1; see also JONES & WOLL,
supra note 49, at 161 (committee staff director issued a phantom 56 billion dollar
appropriation hearing report).
67. FENNO, supra note 33, at 148.
68. See M. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 29.

69. E.g., Travel Abuse Laid to Federal Agency: Staff Report Accuses EPA
Aides of Unreported Vacations on Trips Paid by Taxpayers, N.Y. Times, March 22,
1979, § A., at 20, col. 3; Safety Agency Accused of Laxity in Guardian Role, Wash.
Post, May 17, 1977, § A., at 2, col. 1 (evidence from staff investigation); Labor De-

partment Is 'Inept' on Safety Enforcement, Hill Unit Charges, Wash. Post, Sept. 13,
1974, § A, at 2, col. 5 (charges grew from investigation by Senate Labor Subcommittee Staff investigation). See also M. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 5.
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in light of the broad delegation of legislative authority granted to
regulatory agencies.7 0 As one writer succinctly stated, ". . .both the
creators and managers of statutory programs are influenced strongly
by committee reports because the reports are considered to be official expressions of congressional intent, second only to the laws
themselves. 7 1 By drafting these reports with little if any committee
review, 7 committee staff members possess a significant ability to
mold the interpretation of broad statutory mandates. Even the conference committee reports, the most important report documents in
the legislative process, are drafted by staff largely without committee review.7 3 One commentator termed this lack of committee supervision over the drafting of committee reports as the "Achilles heel"
74
of the legislative process.
By delegating report writing duties to their respective staffs,
congressional committees have greatly enhanced their staff's informal negotiating power over the agencies that the respective committees oversee. That is to say that as questions of legislative intent
concerning statutory provisions or agency reporting requirements
arise, committee staff members, who are the drafters of the bills and
reports, become a natural source of congressional intent upon which
agency officials can rely. This agency reliance on the interpretative
value of committee reports has shifted much of the settlement of
regulatory policy-making to behind the scenes negotiation between
the committees' staffs and the agencies themselves.75 Court cases
granting committee staff members immunity in their committee report writing activities only serve to legitimize this alter ego role7
without addressing the legislative significance of this delegation of
authority.
E.

Amending agency statutes

Books written by past and present members of Congress have
drawn attention to the legislative influence of committee staffs.
United States Senator William Cohen wrote in his book entitled
Roll Call:
70. R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra note 49, at 159.
71. Shaman, The Use of CongressionalCommittee Reports in the Administrative Process, 6 IND. L. REV. 481, 484 (1973).
72. K. KOFMEHL, supra note 23, at 121.
73. Id. at 206.
74. Id. at 123.
75. Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1417 (1977).
76. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). See also The Speech or Debate
Clause Protection of Congressional Aides, 91 YALE L.J. 961, 968 (1982) ("The standard set forth in Gravel permits congressional aides to assert speech or debate protection for facially legislative acts that they undertake of their own accord").
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They draft the laws that will change the shape of America to conform
to their visions of equity, the environment and the life-styles of the
future. Only in the presence of Senators do the committee staffers fall
back into the shadows. Their retirement from the center of control is
temporary only-the Senators will move quickly on the treadmill toaccustomed to
ward another engagement. The staff members are quite
7
running the committees according to their plans.
However, the influence of a growing committee staff has also had
important regulatory implications. For instance, after major legislative differences have been settled, the implementation details are
left to the staff. In fact, these "details" are so important that one
commentator has stated that they "can frequently mean everything
to whole industries or groups of people." ' Michael Pertschuk, from
his unique perspective, also emphasized the importance of these
"details." Pertschuk stated that "[t]he craft of effecting regulatory
schemes is an arcane art, the difference between effective and token
regulation may well turn on the artful shaping of apparently innocuous and routine legislative boiler-plate." 9
Thus, increased committee staff input can and does have a significant impact on resulting regulation and its implementation. In
the words of John Quarles, former Deputy Administrator of the
EPA:
Much of the problem (referring to water pollution law implementation) stems from a well-intentioned but ill-conceived effort on the part
of young congressional staff to force the agency to make more rapid
progress than is physically or technically possible. The staff members
who draft such legislation believe that short deadlines, combined with
highly detailed regulatory requirements, are the only way to keep the
agency "honest" and keep the pressure on polluters.80
The staff impact, argues Quarles, has meant that Congress must now
frequently re-examine and change basic pollution control statutes in
order to deal with problems that were unanticipated when the legis1
lation was first drafted.
F.

The Legislative Veto

Rather than being the exclusive tool of elected members of Congress to hold the regulators accountable, the legislative veto has, instead, ironically promoted closer ties between two unelected subsys77.

W. COHEN, ROLL CALL 200 (1981).

78. Malbin, Congressional Committee Staffs: Who's in Charge Here?, 47 PUB.

R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AGAINST ITSELF 259
(1977) ("senatization" dependence on staff is fast engulfing the House) [hereinafter
cited as R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK].
79. M. PERTSCHUK, supra note 51, at 27.
INT. 16, 18 (1977); see also

80. Bicentennial Institute, supra note 57, at 727.
81. Id. at 728.
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tems, namely the agency staff and the committee staff. The threat of
a formal legislative veto by Congress has resulted in a stronger bargaining power of committee staff. This stronger bargaining power
ensures that regulations will be altered, changed, or eliminated in
response to pressure from congressional staff upon whose recommendation members of Congress rely." Studies of regulatory development in the Department of Education8" and General Services Administration84 confirm the existence of an enhanced power that the
legislative veto confers upon congressional staff in their negotiations
with agency regulators. In fact, Bruff and Gelhorn's study of legislative vetoes concluded that informal staff negotiations would be seriously impaired in the absence of a veto provision. 5 Perhaps that
explains why the growth of congressional staff in 1975 coincided
with the proliferation of legislative vetoes in that same year. 8
G.

Casework

While staff assistance with constituent-agency disputes is not
usually classified as a formal oversight mechanism, at least one
writer's research into this aspect of staff activity concludes that
casework has significant potential to affect internal agency activity."
Casework, while not a systematic approach to activity, does keep
staff in regular contact with agency personnel.88 Furthermore, although casework is usually handled by the Congress' personal staffs,
committee staff become involved through committee members' referrals when the problem involves an agency over which the commit82. B. CRAIG, supra note 52, at 126.
83. Id. at 91. After congressional vetoes of former education regulations one
committee aide commented: "Education is consulting with committee staff over proposed regulations much more closely."
84. Bruff & Gelhorn, supra note 75, at 1398-99. Bruff & Gelhorn stated:
While formulating the first set of rules, GSA consulted closely with the staffs
of a Senate committee and a House subcommittee. In a series of twelve to
fifteen meetings with the Senate staff, GSA presented drafts of the regulations
for comment and criticism and then revised the drafts for presentation at the
next meeting. Significant changes were also made on the early drafts after long
line-by-line sessions with House staff. These negotiations reduced the number
of unresolved issues to five or six the time the regulations formally reached
Congress. There was no public participation in the rulemaking because the
statute did not require it. And GSA would not have entered negotiations with
the committees in the absence of a veto provision.
Id.
85. Id. at 1420.
86. Dixon, supra note 31, at 427. Between 1932-1975, there were 295 congressional review provisions in 196 laws. From 1969-mid 1974, there were 10 such statutes, while in 1975 there where 21 statutes with 58 legislative review provisions.
87. Johannes, Casework as a Technique of U.S. Congressional Oversight of the
Executive, IV LEGIS. STUD. Q. 325 (1979).
88. Id. at 341.
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tee has jurisdiction.89
Significantly, the process by which congressional casework is
handled has changed dramatically since the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. As Fox and Hammond pointed out:
In 1946, Congressmen appeared with constituents before executive
branch departments and agencies; they were hesitant to delegate this
activity to aides. Today, aides handle most constituency casework and
Federal projects work and now Congressmen worry that they spend
too much time responding to staff, and not enough listening to each
other and exchanging ideas.90
Committee staffs have thus been delegated more authority to affect
agency activity. Patrick McLain, Counsel for the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, noted
that members need not do much more than sign a letter to get action.91 McClain stated, in fact, that it is "amazing what can be accomplished by a letter or by staff work. ' 9 2 The wide latitude of permissible staff involvement in agency casework also strengthens their
position. Former U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell summarized legitimate staff activity in this area in the following way:
. .[Ilt is not improper for a member of Congress or a congressional
aide to attempt to influence a specific administrative decision... through the submission of facts or arguments or views that go
to the merits of the decision provided the submission is made in a way
that is 9 consistent
with the agency procedures that govern the
3
*

decision.

H.

Confirmation Hearings

A 1977 congressional survey of committee staff members who
had responsibility for the oversight of regulatory agencies concluded
that confirmation hearings of agency appointees were one of the
most frequently used techniques of oversight.9 This technique is
89. Id. at 343.
90. H. Fox AND S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFF 4 (1977).
91. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Oversight in Action,
(Feb. 1984) (audio brief on congressional oversight).
92. Id.
93. G. BELL AND R. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 91 (1982). See also 5
U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982) (providing that employee presiding over reception of evidence
shall make the recommended decision); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corp. of
Engineers, 534 F. Supp. 1139 (D.D.C. 1982) (contractor was denied due process of law
when it did not receive constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards prior to debarment); and Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (Cir. 1966) (corporation denied
procedural due process where thrust of senators' questions and comments to the commissioners were directed to the correctness of the commission's approach). But see
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Oversight and Congressional

Policymaking (Feb., 1984) (audio brief) (where Congressman Dingell described the
Pillsbury doctrine limits on regulators' testifying as "non-existent").
94. STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 18, at 146.
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ranked third, however, in terms of effectiveness." It is ranked after,
first, members' personal communications to agencies and, second,
authorization and appropriation hearings. Despite certain limitations,9" staff continue to use confirmation hearings to influence
agency activity. Under Senator Magnuson, the consumer-oriented
Senate Commerce Committee staff did most of the work involving
nominees would
the screening of nominees to ensure that the these
97
aggressively execute the agency's responsibilities.
I. Summary
Staff communication with the agency ranked, on average, as the
most frequently used and most effective technique of all those previously mentioned. 9" Furthermore, as a House subcommittee report
concluded, no matter what technique is used a professional committee staff is needed to carry it out.99 A 1977 U.S. Senate study, in
fact, concluded that the

"...committee

staff shoulder much of the

oversight task." 100
Consequently, the reality of congressional control over federal
regulators lies, not in the existence of formal congressional oversight
techniques, but rather in the exercise of informal staff power within
the formal oversight process. Davidson summarized the extent of
these informal oversight powers as follows:
Many staff aides have latitude to develop, sell, and mobilize support
for their ideas. On occasion, such "entrepreneurial" staff may unilaterally leak information, plant stories with the press, issue reports, harass agency officials, or invoke their member's name to do things he or

she might be unaware of.'0'

The exercise of these considerable committee staff powers to influence regulatory behavior, used in conjunction with and in addition
to existing formal congressional oversight techniques, has largely
been ignored. Yet, can any attempt to increase congressional control
over regulatory agencies be effective if the informal committee staff
role is not fully considered? Having examined the powers that com95. Id. at 146-47.
96. See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1061 (1975). "There is a series of precedents, drawing strength
from the Administrative Procedures Act, which prohibit members of Congress from
making off-the-record attempts to influence the decision in particular administrative
proceedings and from questioning members of an agency in committee hearings as to
their intentions in pending cases." Id.
97. FTC Oversight/Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 631 n.219 (1982).
98. STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 18, at 152.
99. FederalRegulation and Regulatory Reform: Report by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 545 (1974).
100. STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 18, at 17.
101. R. DAVISON & W. OLESZEK, supra note 78, at 240.
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mittee members may exercise over regulators, the focus of this paper
now shifts to an examination of the way that committee staffs have
influenced the congressional oversight and regulatory decision-making processes.
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND REGULATORY PROCESS

The impact of an enlarged and increasingly influential congressional committee staff bureaucracy on the regulatory process has
been felt both in the congressional oversight and in the agency decision-making process. Modern congressional oversight has largely
evolved into a series of informal controls exercised by committee
staff members. These informal controls exist almost exclusively except where Congress is prodded into action by a regulation that
raises a salient political issue.'0 2 The more complex and obscure the
regulatory issue, the greater the committee staff influence will be.10 3
Similarly, regulatory agency decision-making has shifted from formal congressional directives and interaction to informal committee
and agency staff negotiation outside the formal regulatory development process. This has resulted in the addition of another unelected
layer of government and thus has separated the regulated from the
regulators. Consequently, the development of a coherent regulatory
policy has been stymied as more and more regulatory policy has
been allowed to develop through an informal committee/agency staff
negotiation process. In this process regulatory policy formation has
eluded formal congressional review.
A.

The Impact of Committee Staff on the Congressional
Oversight Process

Turning first to the committee staff impact on the congressional
oversight process, the result of increased congressional dependence
upon and delegation of authority to its committee staff for regulatory oversight has meant a diminished formal role for Congress in its
attempts to control the regulators. In effect this result, if not intended, was certainly not an unwelcomed consequence for a Congress already mired in a complex legislative arena.
Indeed, at the committee level, at least one powerful committee
chairman encouraged a staff leadership role in committee oversight
hearings. As Congressman Dingell, chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce stated: "The best run oversight hear102. G. GOODWIN, THE LITTLE LEGISLATURES 149 (1970). Staff have greater influence on Senate committees, committees that handle routine matters, and on committees with high membership turnover.
103. CMU Survey, supra note 16.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:247

ing would be one in which the counsel of the committee would actually conduct the questioning, and then members would be afforded
their time.

' 10 4

A United States Senate study also recommended that

staff members be given more opportunities to ask follow-up questions of witnesses at hearings. 105
Thus, Congress viewed the encouragement of an increased staff
role as a positive development in the modern congressional oversight
process. Congressman Dingell emphasized the desirability of this
new staff role by noting: "We try to improve the ability of the committee and the members to ask the proper questions by careful staff
briefings of the members beforehand; and usually on the oversight
subcommittee our members will in fact work very closely with the
staff to get proper lines of questions laid out.""0 The extent of congressional delegation to its staff was apparent when the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs was forced to question its own
aides, through sworn testimony, about the manner in which the
committee handled the 1977 investigation of Bert Lance's tangled
financial dealings.107 This incident provided an opportunity to
briefly pierce the curtain of formalism that cloaks the true informal
workings of committee staff members.
In summary, one committee staff director tersely described the
new committee oversight process as follows: "The committee makes
the decision, but it's left to the staff to put it in shape." 08 United
States Senator Sam Nunn warned about danger of this new staff
emphasis: "We are in a position of being deferential to staff because
they have a lot of power and run the subcommittees. They wield the
power but they are not a responsible part of the process."109 Finally,
Jones and Woll summarized the diminished oversight role of the
modern congressional committee. According to Jones and Woll the
diminished role resulted from increased reliance on its staff. Jones
and Woll noted: "Committees, however, are mere symbols of power,
10
not power itself, unless they are accompanied by adequate staff."
The enlarged committee staff also transformed the process by
which Congress, as a whole, deliberated issues of regulatory as well
as legislative concern. Michael Malbin, in fact, wrote:
104. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Oversight and Congressional Policymaking (Feb., 1984) (audio brief).
105. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 18, at viii.
106. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Oversight in Action,
(Feb., 1984) (audio brief on congressional oversight).
107. R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra note 49, at 165.
108. The Shadow Government Operatingon CapitalHill, U.S. NEws & WORLD

REP., June 27, 1983 at 65.
109. Casper, The Committee System of the United States Congress, 26 AM. J.
COMp. L. 359, 375 (1978 Supp.).
110. R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra note 49, at 128.
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On the one hand dependence on congressional [sic] staff has, as we
have seen, increased the relative power of technocratic issue specialists and of groups with no economic or political constituency. This
both reflects and reinforces the complexity of government. On the
other hand, Congress has reacted to the government complexity it has
created by building up its staffs defensively to preserve an important
role for itself. But the size of those staffs and the way they are used
has reinforced a situation in which the deliberative aspect of representation gets short shrift on all but the broad outlines of a few issues."'
A good example of the increased impact on the role of staff in
congressional deliberations involved the impasse over the passage of
the landmark Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, legislation that would directly affect agency spending capabilities.
United States Senator Robert Byrd established a staff working
group to hammer out a compromise and, as Davidson pointed out,
"after 90 hours in 25 sessions during 16 days, the staff groups' ef'
forts succeeded: the consensus legislative budget bill passed 88-0. 11a
Thus, congressional deliberations over this important piece of legislation were replaced by informal staff negotiations.
The growth of committee staff influence also created a new tension in Congress. This phenomenon pitted a generalist-oriented, directly participative Congress against a large number of professional
experts upon whom Congress had grown dependent." 8 A 1979 survey of over 200 House members indicated, by large margins, that the
growth and size of committee staffs caused serious problems. The
same survey also revealed that committee, not personal staffs, had
contributed to the fragmentation and unmanageability of the House
committee system."" Yet, Congress has not attempted to undo what
Kofmehl had warned against: the establishment of a competing staff
bureaucracy in subordinate units of Congress." Instead, the formal
congressional regulatory oversight process has largely shifted to informal committee/agency staff interactions providing greater opportunities for the exercise of informal staff oversight powers.
B.

The Impact of Committee Staff on Agency Regulatory
Decision-Making

As the performance of oversight responsibilities shifted from a
formal role performed by Congress to an informal and largely unsupervised committee staff intervention, so too did influence over
111. M. MALBIN, supra note 14, at 250.
112. R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, supra note 101, at 253.
113. R. FENNO, supra note 33, at 145.
114.

HousE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMIrrEEs: FINAL REPORT,

Sess. 266 (1980).
115. K. KOFMEHL, supra note 23, at 146.

96th Cong., 2d
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administrative rule-making shift from formal oversight techniques
to an informal committee and agency staff negotiation process.
Thus, congressional committee staff emerged in the 1970's as a principal regulatory actor in what Arthur S. Miller termed "a nonstatutory web of interactions that made up a substructure of government
in spite of the facade of separation of powers.
... 1I6 Staff interaction transformed the modern regulatory process from formal congressional oversight into "a series of bargains between second-echelon administration officials and committee staff."""7 And their
impact, as Charles Jones elaborated, has been considerable:
Presidential and congressional staff positions are more than jobs.
They come to be the connecting tissue among elected public officials,
between them and the bureaucracy, and between them and private
interests. These staff serve as an institutional memory for the many
commitments made in the name of public officials. 18
So concerned was Robert Reich about this informal staff negotiation
power that he warned: "[Tihe public rule-making process may become a sideshow, unrelated to the real powers of negotiation among
congressional committee staff, agency staff, White House aides and
special interest representatives who will dictate the substance of the
rule.""' 9
The frequent enactment of the legislative veto provisions to
agency enabling legislation after 1974 only served to strengthen the
already considerable negotiation power of committee staff when
dealing with agency officials, and this was at the expense of the formal public rule-making process.2 As Professor Gelhorn warned
Congress during congressional hearings on the administrative rulemaking process: the legislative veto "may focus the analysis of administrative regulations away from the administrative area where it
must be somewhere in public under section 553 of the APA and in116. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 374 (1977).
117. J. KINGDOM, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 44 (1984).
118.

C. JONES, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY in THE NEW CONGRESS 247

(1979).
119. Reich. Politicizing the Fourth Branch, 229 NATION 212 (1979).
120. A unique twist to the shift to informal staff negotiation in the late 1970's
was that, for the first time, the possibility existed for congressional negotiations with
controversial agencies such as the FTC and CPSC to be conducted between current
and former committee staffers, the latter having been appointed to agency policy-

making positions. Quality of the Regulators: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Senate Committees on Commerce and Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975). Prior to 1975, no commissioner appointed to
the EPA, FTC, CPSC or OSHA had formerly held a congressional staff position.
However, after 1975 at least three prominent committee staffers were appointed as
commissioners to one or more of these agencies. The three appointees were Michael
Pertschuk (FTC, 1977), David Clanton (FTC, 1976), and Stuart Statler (CPSC, 1979).

19861

Agency Regulatory Decision-Making

stead to private sessions before individual Members of Congress or I
would suggest more likely before their staff." '21 With the power of
committee staff to screen the regulations and negotiate their final
form, largely without congressionalsupervision, the logical conclusion is that the committee staff, for better or worse, left their distinct mark on the final regulatory product. 22
Two examples confirm this conclusion. First, the Assistant Secretary for Legislation for the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, testified that the Education Department staff "met in an
exhaustive series of approximately 20 meetings over the course of a
month and a half after the bill (the Education Amendments of 1974)
was enacted in order to take the views of congressional staff members into account prior to the beginning of the regulations drafting
process."1 ' A second example involved HUD regulations, where
Craig described that department's regulatory process as follows:
"Most major regulations developed by HUD since adoption of the
legislative veto review process in 1978 have been revised as a result
of objections raised by individual members of Congress or committee staffs. Most staff comments have been informal, in other words,
unrecorded." '2 4
Whether committee staff members were acting at the specific
behest of an elected committee member or not, their intervention
had yet another important impact on the regulatory process. The
important impact was that of delay. The increased numbers of committee staffers enabled them to intervene in regulatory activities
more often and to thus require agencies to expend more of their limited time and resources in responding to staff inquiries. Delay, according to a Library of Congress survey of lawyers and administrative law scholars, was listed in the mid 1970's as the most important
problem facing regulatory commissions.'2 5 Furthermore, the impact
of informal negotiations only further weakened the principal goal of
restoring political accountability to regulatory oversight. Reich concluded that "it is difficult to hold any single official responsible for
outcomes that are the product of secret negotiations among congressional, agency, and White House staff and affected industries." 2 '
In addition, either to avoid the political consequences of contro121. CongressionalReview of Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1975).
122. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 75, at 1417. "Indeed, much settlement of policy occurred in behind the scenes negotiations between the staffs of the committees
and the agencies." Id.
123. Id. at 1415 (emphasis added).
124. B. Craig, supra note 52, at 126.
125. Study on Federal Regulation, supra note 18, at 270.
126. Reich, supra note 119, at 122.
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versial programs or to reconcile competing congressional views, Con-

gress directed its committee staff to make broad, and sometimes
conflicting, delegations of legislative authority to agencies.' 27 These
broad delegations 2 8 meant agencies would either need to constantly
consult with Congress (or rather the committee staff bill drafters
who handle all the non front-page regulatory activity) 9 or implement a regulatory scheme on the basis of their own views and interpretations. An increased staff presence made the latter option unlikely in all but the most routine regulations.
When regulators turned to committee staff in the mid-1970's
they faced interpretations by a staff that Ralph Nader characterized
as having "activist, reformist inclinations. . .

."'

Their ties with

consumer and environmental advocates made the committee output
more prolific and "tougher" in terms of regulation than if the committee members were actively in charge. Faced with more statutory
responsibilities than they had time to perform effectively,' combined with limited resources, agency discretion required continued
political guidance. And what better source of guidance than from
the committee staff largely responsible for its creation?" 2 If the
agencies failed to consult with the staff, a procession of bearings'
or even legislative veto likely awaited. Thus, increased congressional
involvement in the implementation of regulatory schemes, chiefly
through a growing committee staff, left agencies subject to an uncertain flow of post-enactment congressional directives. The legal and
political consequence of this continued input meant a regulation
passed by one Congress evolved through subsequent congressional
staff pressures into one "reflecting the current political climate
rather than the congressional intent at the time of the initial
mandate. "'34
127. CongressionalOversight, supra note 30, at 1057.
128. For example, OSHA was directed "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions. . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) and the CPSC to "protect the public against unreasonable
risks of injury associated with consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (b)(1) (1982).
129. B. Craig, supra note 52, at 126-27.
130. D. PRICE, supra note 65, at 18.
131. Statement by Russell Train, former EPA Administrator in CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, THE FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY

113 (1983-84), "Many of EPA's dif-

ficulties over the years can be traced to the fact that Congress loaded the agency with
more statutory responsibilities within a brief period of time than perhaps any agency
could effectively perform."
132. See Schwartz, The CPSC: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1982) (discussion of how the Senate Commerce Committee
staff manipulated the political environment in order to build public support for legislation creating the CPSC).
133. VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 131. House Committee hearings increased from 5,888 in 1973-74 to 7,022 in 1979-80.
134. Congressional Oversight, supra note 30, at 1057. See also Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425, 478 (D.C.
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There is some evidence that committee staff not only influenced
the regulatory development process but also its implementation.
One case study, for example, described the role of subcommittee
staff as "effective administrative decision-makers in the department's rule-making process-not on equal footing with agency staff
but, as a result of the potential for a legislative veto, a powerful and
often decisive final arbiter of the substance of agency rules."18 5 It
could thus be theorized that two common criticisms of the nature of
regulatory activity in the 1970's, the undue delays in implementing
policy and the year-to-year uncertainty as to the type of regulatory
action to be undertaken, could in part be attributed to the committee staff.
Equally important, by delegating to its staff so much of the "details" of regulatory oversight activity, Congress arguably also forfeited much of its political power to alter the programs already implemented. As Malbin wrote:
Instead of thrashing it all out before the fact, the members too often
do not know enough of the details they would need to deliberate until
after a program is implemented. By then, the program will have developed a constituency of its own that will resist the changes that could
more easily have been demanded in advance. "6
As for the impact of increased congressional staff intervention on
the flexibility of regulation,3 7 Bruff and Gelhorn wrote: "Indeed, the
dynamics of the review process may make a negotiated rule substantially harder to change through subsequent public comment. Once
time and energy have been spent in negotiations between an agency
and Congress, both the agency and the committee may be reluctant
to revise the rules that have been thrashed out."' 8
Consequently, control of the process and product of regulatory
activity in the 1970's, as well as its subsequent revision, was informally transferred from Congress to its committee staff without a formal delegation of congressional authority. Thus, while Congress preserved the trappings of formal congressional oversight techniques,
the reality of control of the modern regulatory process lay, not with
Congress proper, but rather with its increasingly influential committee staffs.
Cir. 1982).
135. B. CRAIG, supra note 52, at 127.
136. M. MALB N, supra note 14, at 248.
137. See HousE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98th CONG., 2d SEss.,
REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS (Comm. Print 1984)
(contrast on the views of congressional oversight by former FTC chairman and committee staffer Pertschuk and FTC Chairman James Miller).
138. Bruff & Gelhorn, supra note 75, at 1414.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:247

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the period between the resignation of President
Nixon in 1974 and the election of President Reagan in 1980 represented a watershed in federal regulatory development. It was a
unique period of institutional change in Congress and in the growth
of regulatory activity. It also marked the height of power for one
faction of the informal and complex legislative subsystem, the congressional committee staff.
The election of Ronald Reagan and his emphasis on deregulation signaled the beginning of a decline in the congressional committee staff regulatory oversight activity. The 1980 election brought a
more conservative Congress, less inclined to delegate more legislative authority for new regulatory schemes.. The U.S. Senate
switched to Republican control, sending droves of long-time Democratic committee staff members to minority status or to the unemployment line. The House staff bureaucracy was also shaken, with
half of its committees electing new chairmen."8 9 Overall, committee
staff numbers also declined.14
Regulatory agencies experienced a decline in activity, with active agencies such as the EPA, FTC, and CPSC facing smaller budgets and fewer staff,14 and new appointees like James Miller
(FTC), 142 Thone Auchter (OSHA), 4 and the ill-fated Anne Burford
(EPA), retreating from the regulatory explosion of the 1970's. In
1983 in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,'" the
legislative veto was held unconstitutional. Thereafter the absence of
the legislative veto only added to the already declining level of committee staff negotiation in the regulatory oversight process. Nevertheless, the enhanced role of committee staff in the present-day regulatory framework yet remains as a significant consequence of the
regulatory explosion of the 1970's. While Congress claimed that the
increase in the committee staff membership occurred as a response
to growing agency regulatory authority in the 1970's, the real contribution of the staff was in the way that they permanently trans139. The Hidden Power: Who Really Runs Congress, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Mar. 9, 1981, at 47.
140. See VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 8.
141. The Ruleslasher: Federal Deregulation is Running into Backlash, Even
From Some Affected Businesses, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
142. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY DIREcToRY, supra note 131, at 291. Miller
stated: "We have made strong progress in getting away from the notion of national
nannyism and Star Trek law enforcement where the bold go where no man has dared

to go before." Id.
143. Id. at 400. On Auchter: "It is increasingly clear that [Auchter's] direction
will be significantly different both in style and substance from that of his
predecessor."
144.

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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formed the process of controlling the regulators and the regulatory
output. In delegating most of its oversight responsibilities to an
unelected committee staff, Congress completed the transfer of de
facto authority for ensuring the accountability of our regulators
from the elected legislative arena to the unelected agency/staff negotiation level. This transfer has become the unheralded but, nevertheless, significant reality of modern regulatory decision-making.
The enhanced role of the committee staff also compounded the
political accountability problem as Congress became even further removed from the oversight process, resulting in what Michael Pertschuk termed the "revolt against regulation. 1' 45 As Craig wrote:
congressional staff, however, are just as "unelected" and "nameless"
as their executive counterparts. In light of recent studies chronicling
the rise in power and the loose, sometimes nonexistent, level of management and control exercised over staff by their elected congressional
masters, it is reasonable to conclude that they are subject to even less
control than are executive bureaucrats whose rulemaking activities are
at least constrained by provisions of the Administrative Procedures
Act and other regulations for procedural fairness.1' 6
As legal scholars pay more attention to the informal legislative
and regulatory processes, perhaps then we will begin to look beyond
formal legal doctrines and processes to properly assess how subsystems such as the committee staff have affected the nature of regulations we have inherited from the 1970's. The first step in such an
assessment requires recognition of the critical informal role of committee staff in the modern regulatory process. Perhaps then an inquiry into the accountability issue of who regulates the regulators
can be approached more realistically by exploring both formal and
informal regulatory reforms. Until then, the impact that committee
staff has had on our modern regulatory decision-making process will
remain a lasting, albeit unrecognized, legacy.
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